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Department of International and Comparative Labor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations,  
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ABSTRACT  This article identifies and explores the dilemma of migrant advocacy in advanced 
industrial democracies, focusing specifically on the contemporary United States. On the one 
hand, universal norms such as human rights, which are theoretically well suited to advancing 
migrants’ claims, may have little resonance within national settings. On the other hand, the 
debates around which immigration arguments typically turn, and the terrain on which 
advocates must fight, derive their values and assumptions from a nation-state framework that 
is self-limiting. The article analyzes the limits of human rights arguments, discusses the 
pitfalls of engaging in national policy debates, and details the challenges for advocates of 
advancing the cause of policy reform and shifting the frame for thinking about migration over 
the long term. 
 
 
Introduction1
At the same time, most nations have moved toward an increasingly restrictive set 
of immigration policies. Immigration policy has become conjoined with national and 
regional (in the case of the EU) security, taking its place alongside efforts to combat 
drug trafficking and terrorism. The securitization of immigration has bolstered 
national governments’ efforts to reinforce and redefine their borders just as 
globalization is expanding (Andreas, 2009). Rather than constrain nation-states’ 
efforts to control their border and immigration policies (Hollifield, 2004; Sassen, 
 
 
Human migration today is a core feature of globalization. Yet perhaps more than any 
other phenomenon, it also underscores the conflict and tensions between sovereignty 
of the nation-state and the cross-border flows characteristic of a global economy. 
People cross borders to escape violence and persecution, but they also move toward 
work, education, family, and better economic opportunities. Global communications 
technologies—television, movies, the internet, and cell phones—facilitate the 
transmission of information about migration destinations and help maintain 
transnational social networks. Richer nations with growing economies and aging 
populations increasingly rely on migrants to do the “dirty, dangerous, and difficult” 
jobs (ILO, 2002). 
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1999), globalization has rendered borders even more salient as barriers to the ingress 
and movement of non-citizens (Andreas, 2003; Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000).  
In this context, the question of how to counter or reverse restrictive national 
policies toward migrants becomes especially difficult for migrant advocates and for 
migrants themselves. One approach is to draw on international human rights law and 
principles to underscore the notion that migrants have rights that states are obligated 
to uphold. Framing the treatment of migrants as a human rights issue has several 
advantages: 1) most countries have signed on to the main conventions on human 
rights;2
But how effective are universal human rights framings of migration in persuading 
citizens to alter their support for restrictive border and immigration policies? There 
are political, legal, and discursive limits on the use of human rights frames, 
particularly in the United States. Moreover, much of the contemporary debate on 
immigration in the US and other advanced industrial democracies revolves around 
arguments about security, economics, and law—arguments that are rooted in the 
nation-state. This gives rise to the advocate’s dilemma: on the one hand, universal 
norms such as human rights, which are theoretically well suited to advancing 
immigrants’ claims, may have little resonance within national settings; on the other 
hand, the debates around which immigration arguments typically turn, and the terrain 
on which advocates must fight, derive their values and assumptions from a nation-
state framework that is self-limiting, for reasons I explain below.  
 2) a human rights frame supposes equal entitlement and thus equal treatment 
and access to basic rights protections, thereby undermining efforts to exclude 
migrants or to categorize non-citizens as a less deserving class of people; 3) a human 
rights framing implies a universalist approach, and is therefore more consistent with 
global migration, in which rights-bearing individuals move back and forth across 
national borders. International human rights law, then, would appear to be a logical 
structure upon which to construct an alternative justification for promoting and 
defending the rights of migrants within national boundaries.  
How does this dilemma play out for migrant advocates? What are the pitfalls of 
engaging in national policy debates? Why are human rights approaches less effective 
in these debates? How do advocates navigate the discursive terrain in ways that 
would enable them to advance the cause of policy reform and shift the frame for 
thinking about migration over the long term? How to overcome the advocate’s 
dilemma? 
This article considers these questions in the context of the contemporary United 
States. I first review debates on the effectiveness of human rights arguments for 
public advocacy around immigrants’ rights and point out ways in which human 
rights frames are limited instruments. I look next at advocacy groups’ use of rights 
frames that are based on national laws, institutions, and traditions, and indicate their 
limitations in campaigns for unauthorized migrants. I then identify the ways in which 
debates over immigration have unfolded in the United States and argue that 
immigrant advocates are drawn into national policy debates that are largely framed 
by immigration opponents. I also show how states pose additional challenges for 
advocates through the securitized framing of migration. I conclude with a discussion 
of the challenges advocates must overcome if we are to advance toward a radically 
different way of thinking about the place of migration in our times.  
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Assumptions, Definitions, and Normative Concerns 
 
Several clarifications about my focus and the assumptions I make in this paper are in 
order here. First, my primary focus is on advocacy on behalf of unauthorized 
migrants. Advocates face greater framing challenges in this case, as I show below. I 
also look at advocacy on behalf of, rather than by, unauthorized migrants. In most 
cases this advocacy consists of citizens or legal residents working to change policy 
and secure rights and protections for non-citizens, a form of claims-making that can 
be considered altruistic or solidary, in contrast with migrants organizing to represent 
themselves (Passy, 2001). I assume that the frames and strategies that each group 
adopts will differ (Schwenken, 2005). While migrants themselves seek ways of 
framing that advance particular self-perceptions and identities, for which a human 
rights approach might be well suited, advocacy groups are primarily externally 
directed and seek approaches that will be effective in influencing policy and public 
opinion.  
Second, I use the terms “frames” and “framing” to mean a system of values and 
beliefs (i.e. of meaning) and the construction thereof, that resonates with members or 
constituents and motivates them to action (Benford & Snow, 2000). The contentious 
politics surrounding immigration renders a focus on frames and framing processes 
especially relevant (Tarrow, 1998, pp. 106-122). 
Third, I look at public advocacy rather than litigation strategies. Litigation 
strategies are aimed at persuading courts, whereas public advocacy tries to influence 
public opinion, politicians, and policymakers. Litigation strategies are not divorced 
from public opinion, of course, but they are constrained (and enabled) by laws and 
judicial interpretation. In this way, “rights arguments” may be effective in the courts, 
but not yet resonate in the court of public opinion.  
Fourth, I assume that immigration policy largely reflects public opinion, and that 
vocal constituents communicate these preferences to their representatives in the U.S. 
Congress, where most immigration legislation is made. Here I side with those 
authors who identify domestic politics as the primary determinant of immigration 
policy in the United States (Freeman, 1995; Money, 1999), rather than international 
factors, such as human rights norms and international trade, acting as significant 
constraints on states’ elaboration of immigration controls (Hollifield, 2004; Sassen, 
1999; Soysal, 1994). This is not to deny that foreign policy concerns have long 
played a central role in constituting immigration policy. For example, Cold War 
influences shaped immigration policies toward Central Americans in the 1980s and 
continue to define the differences in policies aimed at Cuban and Haitian migrants 
today, and the U.S. government has stepped up its scrutiny of Muslim immigrants as 
part of its “war on terror” in the wake of 9/ll (Fernandes, 2007; Koulish, 2010). 
However, my argument is that domestic public attitudes may also influence 
immigration policies in ways that often contradict market and foreign policy logics.3
Finally, I take a normative position on the ultimate goal of international migrant 
advocacy, which is that the right to free movement should be recognized and 
protected. This “ideal” is clearly not practical in the foreseeable future, nor does it 
necessarily represent the ideal endpoint for many advocates, who may not want to 
jettison immigration controls. Yet in making this normative claim I am also posing 
the question of what it would take to move toward public acceptance of this ideal 
over the long term. I argue that the most commonly used discourses among 
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advocates are limited precisely because they do not break with the premise that states 
have a “right” to exclude people from their territories. I recognize that advocates will 
have more pragmatic goals that, if achieved, can improve the situation of 
unauthorized migrants significantly. However, my point is that anything short of free 
movement will eventually reproduce the exclusions that diminish human dignity.  
There is considerable discussion among political theorists about how to construct a 
morally defensible position on immigration and whether the exclusions of 
immigration policies are consistent with liberalism (Carens, 1987; P. Cole, 2000; 
Walzer, 1983). Similarly, theorists have shown how concepts of nation and national 
belonging must be rethought or even purged to begin to construct a philosophy of 
movement (Sharma, 2006; Stevens, 2009). These discussions are essential, but 
widespread acceptance (even by theorists) of the “need” for national borders 
illustrates how far we have to go in crafting an alternative vision (P. Cole, 2000). My 
aim here is more limited: it is to highlight the tensions between advocacy discourses 
and this goal of free movement, and to identify the counter-framing challenges that 
pro-migrant advocates face. 
 
 
Promise and Limits of International Human Rights 
 
Migrants, whether or not they are authorized by states that they enter, are entitled to 
recognition and protection of their basic human rights as stated in numerous 
international human rights documents and conventions.4
Many scholars and advocates see in international human rights frameworks the 
means through which to secure and protect rights for non-citizens who may 
otherwise find themselves excluded or adversely affected by national laws. Despite 
his acknowledgment of significant impediments to the effective use of human rights 
arguments, David Cole (2006) states that human rights discourse “offers tremendous 
normative power and potential for advancing social justice on behalf of foreign 
nationals in the United States” (p. 629). Beth Lyon (2008) shows how immigrant 
worker advocates in the US have begun to appeal to international law forums to seek 
favourable judgments and to broaden awareness of the conditions immigrant workers 
face. She states that “the language of international human rights can be unifying and 
meaningful” for immigrants.  
 These principles, laws, and 
conventions enable migrant advocates to construct a universal or “global frame” for 
migrant rights that essentially renders borders and national immigration laws 
immaterial to the goal of upholding the fundamental rights of migrants as human 
beings and as migrants. In this way the human rights frame cuts through the 
nationally bounded frameworks within which most public discourse about migrants 
takes place. 
Yet despite recognition of its potential, many scholars also agree that international 
human rights arguments still face considerable obstacles. In the United States, 
immigrant advocates rarely use international human rights arguments in their 
domestic work or in the courts (Lyon, 2008, p. 40). This is due in part to scepticism 
about human rights and to constraints on the Courts’ interpretation of the 
constitutionality of immigration laws (D. Cole, 2006, p. 629).5 In the international 
arena, states generally remain impervious to human rights violation charges, 
especially in the area of unauthorized migration. This is so for several reasons. 
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International human rights law with regard to migration remains relatively weak and 
cedes to states’ sovereign power to restrict access to their territory. Although 
international covenants stipulate humane treatment of persons regardless of 
citizenship status, they do not impose obligations on states to accept non-citizens or 
to provide them with access to basic rights (Dauvergne, 2005). Legal systems are 
also still rooted in national institutions, law, and politics, which are normally 
oriented around rights of citizens. As Catherine Dauvergne (2008) notes in Making 
People Illegal, “Human rights arguments have worked poorly for those without a 
legal right to be present. It has proven remarkably difficult to separate a legal right to 
be present within a state from a right to simply ‘be’” (2008). 
Advanced industrial democracies that violate rights are also less vulnerable to 
international pressure or condemnation than are poorer nations. No rich country has 
ratified the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their 
Families, whereas most developing (and migrant-sending) countries have (Yau, 
2005). In the realm of unauthorized migration, moreover, wealthier countries have 
converged in their more restrictive policies, leaving few outside of this group able to 
criticize them on human rights grounds. 
Another difficulty with human rights discourses is that they often appear abstract, 
especially in the absence of effective enforcement in international forums (D. Cole, 
2006, p. 632; Dauvergne, 2008). They also tend to be highly legalistic and technical 
(Elias, 2008, p. 296), and fail to elicit responses from mass publics in ways that 
could be politically effective. Social movement scholars (Benford & Snow, 2000), 
cultural sociologists (Lamont & Thevenot, 2000) and linguists (Lakoff, Hazen, & 
Dean, 2004; Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006) all note the importance of “resonance” with 
constituents’ cultural context to enable mobilization around an issue. Despite the 
global advance of human rights norms, however, international human rights 
discourses still lack resonance in many advanced liberal democracies, especially in 
the United States. Finally, some scholars have noted the problematic character of 
“mainstream” human rights discourses because they tend to ignore inequalities in 
access to rights that derive from economics and power relations, which have 
gendered implications, among other consequences (Basok, 2009; Elias, 2008, p. 
285). 
These reservations about human rights discourses have led some scholars to 
distinguish between juridical and sociological notions of rights, in which the former 
represents a more traditional, legalistic view and the latter stresses the political 
process of identifying and claiming rights within specific social struggles rather than 
through law and legal institutions (Grugel & Piper, 2007, pp. 18 & 32; Merry, 2003). 
While this may be a promising way to think about the liberating possibilities of 
“rights talk” for migrants themselves, I argue that human rights discourses in general 
are less effective today in persuading publics of the rights of undocumented or 
irregular migrants to move or remain in a country where they lack status. Human 
rights discourses fall short on legalistic grounds, because of the weakness of 
international law protections for non-status migrants, and in generating cultural 
resonance with citizens, because of the emotional power of competing, national 
frames for viewing migration.  
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National Rights Frames in U.S. Immigrant Advocacy 
 
In his report to the Human Rights Council of the UN General Assembly, Dr. Jorge 
Bustamante, the Special Rapporteur for Migration, concluded that “the United States 
has failed to adhere to its international obligations to make the human rights of the 
37.5 million migrants living in the country…a national priority, using a 
comprehensive and coordinated national policy based on clear international 
obligations” (Bustamante, 2008). The report argued that the US was violating 
international law and standards as found in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),6
Was this a missed opportunity, the result of inefficient dissemination by advocacy 
groups? Or did this omission reflect the general weakness of human rights arguments 
in the United States? A review of the websites of eight national immigrant advocacy 
organizations in the United States showed that most of these advocacy groups 
employed a rights-based discourse in at least some part of their public 
communications.
 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
Convention and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Despite the report’s 
source and its hard-hitting criticism, it garnered only limited headlines in the United 
States. Although two national advocacy organizations, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) and the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights 
(NIRR), coordinated the Special Rapporteur’s visit (Lyon, 2008, p. 38), most 
advocacy groups did not highlight the document in their campaigns. Indeed, many 
immigrant advocates seemed unaware of its existence. 
7 References to human rights, however, tended to be vague and 
disconnected from specific international conventions.8 More often rights were 
defined in national-legal terms. Groups framed their advocacy in terms of workers’ 
rights, civil rights, “legal rights,” and constitutional rights.9
Such national rights frames arguably resonate more in the United States than do 
international rights claims. For example, civil rights constitutes a powerful “master 
frame” for social movements in the US, since it draws upon the civil rights struggles 
among African Americans and other minority groups in the United States (Snow & 
Benford, 1992, p. 145). Moreover, the power of national rights approaches resides in 
the implicit claim that immigrants are entitled to the same rights and protections as 
U.S. citizens, and that the violation of these rights in the case of immigrants may 
redound upon citizens. But civil and constitutional rights frames may not always 
work for noncitizens, since the law does not entitle them to equal treatment and equal 
protection in all cases. The extension of these rights claims to the undocumented is 
even more difficult. As Bosniak (2000) notes, citizenship is typically defined in 
opposition to alienage. In this way, frames that advance rights based on national laws 
are limited in that they ultimately rely on insider/outsider, citizen/alien distinctions.  
 Civil rights were stressed 
by five of the eight groups reviewed, whereas legal advocacy groups, such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the National Immigration Law Center, 
emphasized constitutional rights. 
This is not to say that there are no areas in which citizenship or immigration status 
do not matter. Some legal rights, protections, and entitlements in the US today apply 
equally to citizens and non-citizens, legal or otherwise. This is the case with some 
constitutional rights, access to public K-12 education, and labour rights to the extent 
that these are protected in U.S. labour law (D. Cole, 2006; Lyon, 2008). Advocacy 
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groups can focus on realizing those rights to which even the undocumented are 
entitled by law by virtue of their presence in the territory or their status as a worker.  
Nonetheless, even here legal protections for immigrants have been eroded as the 
enforcement climate in the US has hardened. The best example of this in the area of 
workers’ rights is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in the case of Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board, in which the Court 
determined that workers’ undocumented immigration status precluded them from 
receiving back pay as a remedy in cases of violations of their right to engage in 
union activity or in cases of workplace discrimination. The argument of the majority 
of justices was that lending full protection to undocumented workers would 
encourage illegal immigration (Lyon, 2008, p. 29). Federal and state governments 
have passed laws in recent years that further circumscribe non-citizens’ rights by 
limiting their access to welfare programs, employment rights, and procedural rights 
such as due process.  
The shortcomings of rights framings for migrants have been further noted by a 
number of scholars, both in the United States and in other countries. Statham and 
Mynott (2002) show that framing issues in terms of racial politics and anti-racism 
resonated better in Britain than did using migrant rights frames. Fujiwara (2005) 
argues that humanitarian reasoning provided an effective counter-framing strategy to 
combat laws that made non-citizens ineligible for public benefits in Oregon, despite 
an initial effort to campaign under the banner of “immigrant rights are human 
rights.” Schwenken (2005) examines how European advocates framed migrant 
domestic workers’ issues in terms of combating human trafficking in order to gain 
access to policymakers, even while migrant domestic workers themselves preferred 
to push the “workers’ rights” frame. In each of these cases, “rights talk” did not 
resonate with media, officials, and the broader public as much as did other rationales, 
such as racism, aid to the elderly and the disabled, and domestic slavery. Rights-
based discourses, while perhaps consistent with long-term goals of advocates (and 
migrants), were often insufficient for achieving specific gains in real campaigns.  
 
 
The Evolution of U.S. Immigration Policies in the 2000s 
 
 The history of immigration in the United States is replete with examples of 
restrictive policies and nativist reactions against newcomers (Nevins, 2002; Ngai, 
2006). The present wave of anti-immigrant sentiment and immigration restriction 
emerged in California with the 1994 passage of Proposition 187, a restrictive 
measure that would have, among other things, required teachers and health care 
workers to report undocumented immigrants using their services. Although 
Proposition 187 did not survive a court challenge, other state and local initiatives 
would later multiply across the country, especially in the first decade of the new 
century (Moser, 2006).  
At the same time that U.S., Mexican, and Canadian authorities celebrated the 
cross-border flow of trade and capital with the signing of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, the U.S. government redoubled its efforts at boundary 
enforcement on the US-Mexico border (Nevins, 2002). In 1994 the U.S. Attorney 
General announced an enforcement initiative designed to “shut down the traditional 
corridors for the flow of illegal immigration along the southwest border” (U.S. GAO, 
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2006, pp. 6-7). The strategy called for increasing control of the border through the 
addition of personnel and technology in order to make border crossings more costly 
and difficult. As urban areas came under control, migrants would be diverted to more 
remote areas where they could be detected and apprehended by Border Patrol more 
easily and where the difficult terrain of mountains, rivers, and deserts would act as a 
deterrent. The result of this initiative, called the Southwest Border Strategy, was a 
redirection of the migrant flow toward eastern California and the Sonora Desert in 
Arizona, continued crossing attempts, and an increase in border-crossing deaths due 
to exposure (Cornelius & Lewis, 2007; Nevins, 2008). 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, 
immigration became increasingly tied to national security (Koulish, 2010; Nguyen, 
2005). The reorganization of border enforcement and immigration under the 
Department of Homeland Security in 2003; the stepped-up enforcement at the border 
in the form of a greater number of Border Patrol agents, National Guard deployment, 
proposed construction of a 700-mile border fence, and use of virtual technology 
(Andreas, 2009, pp. 156-158; Koulish, 2010; U.S. GAO, 2009); vigilante initiatives 
such as the Minutemen; and media attention, as in CNN’s Lou Dobbs’ “broken 
borders” series (Chavez, 2008), all reinforced the notion that borders needed to be 
“secured.”  
Working through the Department of Homeland Security, the administrations of 
George W. Bush (2001-2009) and Barack Obama (2009-2013) concentrated on 
enforcing existing laws and increased the financial and human resources that made it 
possible for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to expand its 
apprehension of immigrants slated for deportation. In 2006, ICE began a series of 
strategically targeted workplace raids. Several thousand immigrants were arrested, 
detained, and deported in these raids. Deportations increased each year: from 
288,663 individuals in FY 2007 to a record 387,790 in FY 2009, a five percent 
increase over the FY 2008 total of 369,221 deportations (Hsu & Aizenman, 2010; 
Park, 2008). Under its National Fugitive Operations Program, ICE began in 2003 to 
round up “criminal” and “fugitive aliens.10
The scale and speed with which these enforcement measures were enacted in a 
relatively short period made it difficult to counter them with any large or effective 
campaign. Despite polls indicating that most Americans supported immigration 
reform (Doherty, 2007), politicians from both parties continued to resist legalization 
for undocumented immigrants. The U.S. Congress repeatedly failed to pass 
immigration reform, leaving unaddressed the question of what to do about 12 million 
undocumented immigrants. Immigration reform remained on the back burner well 
into the second year of President Obama’s administration. Moreover, the Obama 
administration retained, and in some cases, escalated many of the enforcement 
initiatives begun in the Bush administration, such as the 287(g) program of 
collaboration between local law enforcement and immigration authorities, detention 
and deportation policies, and border security, including the deployment of 1,200 
National Guard troops (Archibold, 2010b; Preston, 2009).  
 This included individuals whose actions 
ranged from serving out a jail term for homicide or armed robbery to failure to obey 
a deportation order; many “non-fugitive” immigrants were also apprehended at 
home, at parking lots, at train and bus stations, and at traffic stops (Mendelson, 
Strom, & Wishnie, 2009). Nearly 380,000 immigrants were held in administrative 
detention in 2009, another record (Detention Watch Network, 2010).  
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States and municipalities continued to forge immigration-related initiatives despite 
the federal government’s jurisdiction over immigration matters. The most 
contentious example to date of a state initiative on this matter was SB 1070, a bill 
approved by the Arizona legislature and signed into law by the Governor in April, 
2010.11
 
 Among other immigration-related measures, the bill called on law 
enforcement to check immigration status (Archibold, 2010a). Polls taken shortly 
after the passage of Arizona’s controversial immigration law showed that a majority 
of Americans supported it (Pew Research Center, 2010). Within months of the law’s 
passage, at least twenty states were preparing their own versions of the Arizona 
initiative (Miller, 2010). 
 
Nativist Framings of Immigration 
 
As this brief overview of recent immigration policy indicates, nativists have largely 
defined the debate and agenda for immigration in the US in the last few years (Barry, 
2008b; Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006, p. 6). Nativism as used here refers to the 
expression and exhibition of a preference for U.S. citizens solely because they are 
“native” (De Genova, 2005, pp. 60-61). According to De Genova (2005), nativism is 
not a preoccupation with the foreignness of migrants or of internal minorities as 
much as it is a promotion of the priority of U.S. citizens. In this way there can be 
nativists of the right and of the left, with the latter often adopting racial justice 
positions favouring native minorities (p. 61). Indeed, racist attitudes and expressions 
against immigrants may be a manifestation of nationalist practices, of the desire to 
maintain an “imagined privileged relation” between an equally imagined race, 
ethnicity, or culture and a particular national space (Hage, 1998, pp. 28 & 38; 
Stevens, 2009). In this way, “pro-immigrant” expressions of tolerance for ethnic or 
racial “diversity,” as in official discourses of multiculturalism, can also constitute 
racialized ways of managing national space by those who see themselves as its 
rightful inhabitants (Hage, 1998).  
Nativists have framed the debate in the US through a combination of website 
appeals by lobby groups (Numbers USA),12
What made the nativists’ voice on the immigration issue so powerful, especially in 
the face of similar resolve on the part of immigrants and immigrant rights advocates, 
 popular radio talk shows (e.g., Rush 
Limbaugh), and television “news” (Lou Dobbs on CNN; Fox News). Nativists’ 
domination of local media outlets and their ability to organize at the grassroots have 
shifted the national debate in an increasingly conservative direction. Republicans and 
Democrats who initially supported immigration reform have become more cautious 
or have become restrictionists themselves, as in the case of Republican Senator John 
McCain, a former co-sponsor of a comprehensive immigration reform bill with 
Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy (Goldman, 2010). Those who were earlier 
marginalized as extreme have moved to the mainstream, as former U.S. Republican 
Representative Tom Tancredo’s case shows (Anti-Defamation League, 2007). 
Reflecting this rightward shift, the tenor of the 2007-08 presidential primary 
campaign debates was conservative on immigration. Even when Democrats (and 
Obama) talked about the legalization of 12 million undocumented immigrants, they 
were careful to avoid the term “amnesty,” stressed the need to “get in line,” and 
affirmed their strong support for “securing our borders” as a first step.  
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as shown in the 2006 immigrant rights marches (Bada, Fox, & Selee 2006)? 
Immigration restrictionists drew upon a combination of economic, security, and legal 
arguments to stir anxiety and build on insecurities in sectors of the population 
(Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006; De Genova, 2005). Economic arguments are not new and 
have long been tied to concerns over the impact of trade and the restructuring of 
industry and work in the US. Many economic arguments also reflect a class division 
between those who see their work or wages affected by the presence of immigrants 
and those who see advantages to employers and consumers because of the ability to 
rely on cheap labour. Even though the latest wave of nativism began during a period 
of relative economic prosperity, the recent economic crisis and unemployment in the 
US have lent even more force to these arguments. For example, two of the largest 
immigration-restrictionist groups, Federation for American Immigration Reform 
(FAIR) and Numbers USA, have positioned themselves on the side of “citizen 
workers” during the economic crisis, arguing that high immigration undermines 
American workers (Barry, 2008b).  
Although security issues have long been entangled with immigration debates, in 
the first decade of the 21st century security discourse came to occupy an especially 
important place in these debates. In the post-9/ll environment, nativists and others 
seized upon border security as a symbol of the government’s failure to protect the 
nation. Politicians used security arguments to rationalize both the buildup of national 
border security and the extension of immigration enforcement throughout the 
country (Koulish, 2010). This concern with national security overlapped with a 
growing insecurity about the changes wrought by immigration, especially in “new 
destination” areas of the country, such as southern states that had previously seen 
little immigration from Mexico and Central America (Zúñiga & Hernández-León, 
2005). This insecurity was expressed as a problem of costs to communities (in the 
form of taxes, use of education and health services, and overcrowded housing), but it 
was also seen as a cultural threat. The presence of ethnically different people in 
communities that had long been black and/or white; the encroachment of Spanish in 
stores, signs, radio and television; and the fear that “assimilation” was unlikely to 
occur all contributed to this sense of threat (Chavez, 2008; Huntington, 2004). In this 
way, national security became the means by which to legitimize concerns about 
cultural threat that might otherwise invite accusations of racism.  
Focusing on illegality played a similar legitimating role. “What part of illegal 
don’t you understand?” and “Illegal is illegal, period!” were popular retorts to any 
discussion of immigration reform or of humane treatment for unauthorized 
immigrants. As Lakoff and Ferguson (2006) note, “‘Illegal alien’ not only stresses 
criminality, but stresses otherness” (p. 4). Stressing the illegality of immigrants led to 
calls for punishment via their detention and deportation; denial of access to services, 
benefits, or assistance of any kind; and rejection of policies that would “forgive” past 
transgressions through legalization of status. As Nevins (2002, p. 121) points out, 
“the law” in the United States serves as a powerful ideological construct dividing 
good from evil. In this context, framing anti-immigration sentiments as opposition to 
illegality and support for rule of law makes such sentiments seem more legitimate.  
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Securitization of Immigration: Framing by States 
 
This discussion of framing has so far focused on the role of nativist groups in the US. 
But a growing literature on securitization suggests that states also engage in framings 
around immigration. Indeed, immigration is one area where states can reassert their 
national sovereignty under globalization. The state’s authority and power are most 
clearly manifested in, and symbolized by, its border control policies. Securitizing 
migration leads states to adopt certain policy tools. In particular, states expand their 
use of “techniques of policing” applied to border security (Andreas, 2003). This can 
take the form of high-tech surveillance systems, increases in funding and personnel 
destined to border security, and related policies such as expanded detention, 
expedited removal, and the externalization of borders. 
States also securitize migration through discursive means, by engaging in 
“insecurity framing” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 4). According to Huysmans (2006): 
 
Securitizing immigration and asylum constructs political trust, loyalty and 
identity through the distribution of fear and an intensification of 
alienation. It is a peculiar process of constitution of a political community 
of the established that seeks to secure unity and identity by instituting 
existential insecurity (emphasis mine). (p. 47) 
This mobilization of fear and institution of insecurity are key components of the 
securitization of migration. Both are accomplished by “instituting credible claims” 
that migrants are a “danger, risk, or threat” to the survival of political units, and by 
conveying a sense of urgency or crisis (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 4 & 47). As Hage 
(1998) notes, this process plays on a “trauma resulting from a fear of losing...one’s 
anchorage in the nation” (pp. 23-24). This framing of migration also draws a 
boundary around the political community and privileges this community over 
migrants, outsiders, and foreigners in the allocation of protection and rights. 
Likewise, it creates distance between members of the community and those migrants, 
outsiders, and foreigners. 
Securitizing migration therefore makes ample political sense for states in terms of 
symbolic political value, the assertion of national sovereignty, and the political 
payoff of fear, such as votes for those who advocate border security. While the 
material dimensions of border security—the border militarization and surveillance 
technology—may primarily affect non-citizens, the discursive elements can create 
fear and so generate acceptance of these policies among citizens. 
Citizens who are immigrant advocates, however, may find themselves confronting 
both material and discursive dimensions of securitization head on. Border security 
policies, heightened surveillance, and laws that criminalize aid to migrants can make 
advocates the target of surveillance and prosecution and restrict the resources they 
need to continue their advocacy. The state’s insecurity framing of migration can 
make it even harder for advocates to influence public opinion and to devise effective 
counter-framing strategies. In particular, securitization presents advocates with the 
difficult challenge of reframing migration out of the security discourse of the state, a 
task that requires advocates to effectively displace the fear and insecurity that has 
settled around immigration. 
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Advocates Fight Back? Engaging National Policy Frames 
 
As noted above, most immigration debates in the US in the 2000s are centered on 
three dominant discourses: economics, security, and law. All three begin and end 
with the nation as the primary reference point, and all three are employed by 
opponents of unauthorized migration. Migrant advocates are drawn into these 
dominant ways of framing migration in their efforts to correct, counter, or challenge 
opponents’ arguments. This has the advantage of using language that is intelligible to 
the majority of citizens, but it also poses several fundamental disadvantages for 
advocates.  
First, all three discourses limit one’s ability to draw on universal (not national 
citizenship-based) frames, including human rights. Engaging with these discourses, 
even when positing an inclusive national frame against the exclusionary framing of 
nativists, weakens advocates’ ability to pose more lasting and far-reaching 
alternatives to contemporary approaches to illegal migration, because these would 
require breaking with the “nationalist commonsense” (De Genova, 2005). Second, 
the source of power in nativist arguments lies in their ability to stir citizens’ feelings 
of fear and insecurity (Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006). When advocates diminish those 
concerns or set them aside, they are less likely to succeed in re-framing the way the 
public views the issues. This presents a dilemma for migrant advocates: they either 
talk past the majority of citizens, or else they are forced to accept the nationally 
bounded terms of the debates, putting them in a weaker position vis-à-vis their 
critics. Advocates’ message needs to resonate: it needs to speak to the values, 
concerns, and fears of the majority without succumbing to the same terms of 
reference as the dominant anti-migration frames.  
The difficulties of this task can be seen in the following examples. Much of the 
debate in the United States has focused on costs that undocumented migrants impose 
on public services, or on their impact on wage levels in low-skilled jobs. Migrant 
advocates may take on these arguments via myth-combating or truth strategies, in 
which they point to studies and facts that counter the claims of immigration 
opponents. For instance, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, MALDEF, has set up a website called “Truth in Immigration,” whose mission 
is to rebut legal and factual inaccuracies about immigrants and Latinos.13
Another difficulty is that assertions that “immigrants take American jobs” or that 
they lower wages often require complex economic counter-arguments. These may 
focus on macro-economic or industry studies that show a limited cost burden or 
impact on wages, or a dynamic effect on employment. Yet such studies are 
frequently posed against anecdotal “evidence,” intuitive “folk economics,” and oft-
 To rebut 
myths with facts is an essential task. However, advocates risk getting pulled into 
point-by-point disputations of restrictionists’ claims or “cost arguments” (Bosniak, 
1997), where the relative merits of the pro-migrant position hinge on the costs 
“balancing out.” If it then turns out that undocumented immigrants “cost” more than 
they “contribute,” advocates are forced to abandon their main line of defence. 
Moreover, a disbelief of facts or “fact resistance” tends to operate in the securitized 
setting of immigration. Dauvergne notes (2008, pp. 99-100), “[F]act resistance is 
important because there is no obvious way to counter it ...”. An advocacy based on 
correcting the facts, she continues, “cannot be the entire strategy” (Dauvergne, 2008, 
p. 100). 
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repeated claims in the media, which prove powerful despite their limited reliance on 
facts. Moreover, existing economic studies lend support to different sides of the 
immigration debate (Lowenstein, 2006). Indeed, immigration opponents mobilize 
their own reports, studies, polls, and “facts” to sustain their positions (Barry, 2008b). 
For example, in 2007 a report written by staffers at the conservative Heritage 
Foundation made headlines and was widely cited for stating that the total “tax 
burden” for the U.S. taxpayer of “low-skilled” immigrant households was a 
whopping US$2.2 trillion over the lifetime of those households (Rector, Kim, & 
Watkins, 2007). 
Countering these claims often means that advocates risk coming off as elitist. They 
can appear to condone cheap labour and, in this way, share the pro-business or pro-
employer position (Barry, 2005). To be sure, many labour union advocates present a 
more sophisticated position that both supports working immigrants and calls for 
better enforcement of labour laws, including the right to join unions, to the benefit of 
all workers. But this is not a simple argument that lends itself to sound bites, nor is it 
widely understood or accepted, especially as labour rights claims face their own 
obstacles in gaining broader acceptance in U.S. society and politics (Compa, 2010). 
One common response to the problem of appearing to side with employers has 
been to assert that employers should be punished for hiring undocumented immigrant 
workers. This position also serves to highlight the hypocrisy of U.S. policy, where 
employers continue to hire undocumented workers while little is done to enforce this 
component of U.S. immigration law. The problem with this position for immigrant 
advocates, however, is that once worksite enforcement is adopted more 
systematically (as in recent years), advocates are left with little grounds on which to 
claim that undocumented migrants still deserve to migrate for work, regardless of 
whether or not reasonable and practical legal pathways have yet been adopted. In 
other words, this is not a position that allows one to make a broader claim based on 
the rights of migrants to mobility in search of work. 
Tom Barry writes incisively about the difficult position that immigrant advocates 
find themselves in because their support for immigrants in the labour market reads as 
hostile to the American worker. He urges advocates to engage the economics debate: 
  
…[A]dvocates will need to start explaining how [a pathway to citizenship] 
will serve the common good. Whenever they call for reform, they must tell 
us how immigrants boost the economy, don’t lower the net number of jobs 
available to citizens, and will increase their contributions to economy and 
society once legalized. (Barry, 2008a) 
 
Similarly, Lakoff and Ferguson (2006) argue that a “frame not taken” by 
progressives in the immigration debate is to highlight the benefits of immigrants. But 
they are referring to a U.S. consumer lifestyle that has come to rely on low-wage 
labour: “Cheap labour increases ‘productivity’ and profits for employers, and it 
permits a cheap lifestyle for consumers who get low prices because of cheap labour. 
But these are not seen as ‘problems.’ They are benefits” (Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006, 
p. 6). 
These two positions, both held out by analysts who are sympathetic to immigration 
advocates, illustrate the divergent views within this camp and signal the counter-
framing challenges posed by the economic arguments of immigration restrictionists. 
Moreover, they also highlight another shortcoming of many national-frame debates, 
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which is that advocates are often compelled to show immigrants’ “contributions” and 
“worthiness” to the national economy or society. This discourse of worth and 
deservedness is a long way from a universal human rights framing, which 
presumably would not distinguish among immigrants to determine whether some 
were more or less deserving of human rights.  
Immigration reform proposals in the U.S. Congress are full of just such 
distinctions. For instance, the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors 
Act (DREAM Act) that would provide legalization and a conditional path toward 
citizenship for a subset of young people, states as one of its conditions that eligible 
minors show “good moral character” and worthiness either through attendance at an 
institution of higher education or military service. Most advocates and immigrant 
groups support the DREAM Act and many work to ensure its passage. However, few 
discuss how the Act would fail to help those unauthorized youth who satisfy the 
threshold requirement of entering the US as minors but commit crimes or minor 
offenses, drop out of school, refuse to join the military, or simply go to work after 
graduating from high school (Batalova & McHugh, 2010). This example highlights 
the problem of national frames that are built on conditions and exclusions. 
Immigrants’ basic rights –to security, education, and work—are recognized based on 
national assessments of value, worthiness, and contributions, not on the basis of their 
condition as human beings. 
Immigrant advocates are at a similar disadvantage in taking on the security-
migration nexus. In the years following September 11, 2001, it has become more 
difficult to dismiss security as a rationale for policies aimed at hardening and 
thickening borders or at monitoring and restricting movement of non-citizens 
(Fernandes, 2007; Nguyen, 2005). There is broad acceptance of the idea that “border 
security” is a useful way to monitor terrorist threats, even as scepticism about the 
effectiveness of a border fence is also widespread. This concern with security 
permits advocates to argue in favour of legalization programs for the undocumented 
that would provide security checks and move people “out of the shadows.” What is 
striking, however, is how unpersuasive those arguments have been in the national 
public debate and in the recent immigration reform discussions in Congress.  
This is due in large part to a third powerful way of framing the undocumented 
immigration issue in the US, which is to focus on its illegality. Proposals to legalize 
undocumented immigrants are often met with the argument that legalization rewards 
illegal behaviour and will only beget more illegal activity by encouraging 
unauthorized migration. Advocates who wish to respond to this point must diminish, 
if not dismiss, the importance of the illegality claim. For instance, advocates can 
point out that unauthorized border crossing is a misdemeanour and that unlawful 
presence is a civil violation (Garcia, 2006). In other words, these are not the serious 
crimes that restrictionists claim are perpetuated by migrants. Alternatively, advocates 
can highlight the hypocrisy of the immigration policy, pointing to the lack of 
enforcement on the demand side, as noted above. Or they can stress the contingency 
of the law and especially, of borders, and discuss how U.S. policies themselves have 
“manufactured illegality” (De Genova, 2005; Nevins, 2002). But these are complex 
and difficult arguments, hard to make and harder to diffuse as a popular message.  
Appealing to pragmatism while conceding the unlawful means of entry or overstay 
of immigrants–addressing the “reality” of 12 million undocumented people in our 
midst—has also failed so far in the US. This appeal comes off as a cynical and 
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morally inferior argument against the “principled” stance of restrictionists pushing 
the legality claim. Even proponents of an immigration reform that includes 
legalization qualify this process in conditional and cautionary terms. They seldom 
raise the point that legal immigration is not an option for most poor workers who 
wish to come to the US to work. Rather, proposals have called for immigrants to 
undergo “criminal background checks,” pay a “fine,” and “get at the end of the line” 
behind all of those who have applied legally and are waiting “patiently” (indeed, 
many for over a decade) to get their green cards. This conditionality only reinforces 
opponents’ illegality frame.  
Another difficulty is that advocates may also find themselves divided on many of 
the claims they advance. For example, groups that have long been critical of free 
trade because of the presumed loss of jobs for “American workers” may find it 
especially difficult to make economic arguments in support of immigrant workers 
(and especially, undocumented workers) taking up employment in the US. This is 
one reason why so much is made of the idea that immigrants take work that no 
Americans want to do, or why “safeguards” are often built into foreign worker hiring 
programs (as in the H-2A visa program) to ensure that American workers are given 
the chance to apply first.14
 
 As Nicholas De Genova (2005) points out: 
In spite of the fact that capitalism has been a thoroughly global affair since 
its inception and although there is effectively only one world economy, 
liberal nativist arguments consistently, stubbornly assess the case within a 
narrowly nationalist conceptual framework premised upon the coherence 
of a self-contained “national economy.” (p. 74) 
 
Another potent if debatable position holds that immigrant workers have affected 
the job opportunities and lowered the wages of working-class African Americans, a 
claim supported by some economic studies (De Genova, 2005; Lakoff & Ferguson, 
2006). Although other economists have disputed these studies, the issue remains a 
difficult one for immigrant advocates to address head on. This is because of the risk 
of appearing to dismiss what is a historically sensitive and racially charged theme in 
the US (Pulido, 2007), but also because many “left nativists” share the thesis that 
migrants displace African Americans in the labour market and that this issue should 
command priority (De Genova, 2005, pp. 74 & 77). 
Divisions among advocates occur not only in the arena of economic arguments but 
in debates over legality as well. One reason why the New Sanctuary movement15
In sum, advocates may counter restrictionists’ assertions, but these counter-claims 
often force them onto slippery terrain. Advocates may be drawn into point-by-point 
disputations of restrictionist claims or “cost arguments”, or they may try to diminish 
 has 
seen limited support on the Left is because many people are ambivalent about 
protecting someone who has broken the law through illegal entry and unlawful 
presence. An article in The Nation reflected this ambivalence toward supporting 
sanctuary for “economic migrants” as opposed to political refugees (Abramsky, 
2008). Similarly, faith-based communities are divided on what to do about the 
undocumented. Whereas many see a moral imperative in criticizing U.S. policy and 
in helping the undocumented, others point to biblical passages signalling the 
importance of obeying the “laws of man” on earth and condemn actions that 
circumvent or ignore these laws (Bobo, 2007). 
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or dismiss issues that are emotionally resonant and therefore powerful, such as 
notions of legality, security, as well as cultural and economic threat.  
 
  
Conclusion 
  
I have argued here that given the global occurrence of migration and its links to 
globalization, it makes sense for migrant advocates to base their campaigns and 
actions on a “global frame”: human rights and international law and standards 
applied to migrants. Yet because national legislation, national judicial systems, and 
national sovereignty still play a central role in determining immigration policy, 
international human rights law is a limited instrument for use in seeking rights for 
unauthorized migrants. In most restrictive immigration policy environments, 
moreover, arguments about economics, security, and law articulated within a 
national framework tend to prevail. Advocates employing a global frame may find 
themselves talking past the mass publics they want to influence and unable to 
counter their opponents effectively. Yet the advocates’ dilemma is that those who 
tackle these arguments head on may find themselves trapped within a national 
paradigm and unable to lay the discursive groundwork for a significant shift in the 
way the public views unauthorized migrants. 
How have advocacy groups handled this dilemma? In the United States 
international human rights as a basis for policy-making has had little resonance 
either among policymakers or the public. Advocates have mostly tried to argue 
within nationally bounded frames to pursue rights claims and to address restrictive 
arguments about migration based on economics, security, and legality. However, 
these approaches have failed to produce the kind of mobilization and political 
pressure that change policy and move public opinion. More importantly, they are 
based upon notions of national community that rely on distinctions that invariably 
exclude (some) migrants and support immigration controls. In this way, these 
nationally based approaches fall short of what is needed to advance toward 
widespread acceptance of migration itself as a right.  
Those writing from a securitization perspective argue that states gain from 
mobilizing fear and insecurity, which suggests that as long as nation-states persist, 
the “politics of fear” are likely to remain important in constituting the nation, hardly 
a hospitable scenario for immigrants (Huysmans, 2006). Yet the securitization 
perspective also offers insights for a strategy on advancing migrants’ rights. It 
suggests that the main obstacle to overcome for migrant advocates is not the absence 
of information or poor dissemination of facts regarding immigrants’ circumstances 
and contributions to the nation. Rather, the main challenge for advocates is to 
displace the sources of fear and anxiety about non-citizens.  
In elaborating this strategy, countering myths with facts or truth is important. Yet 
advocates have mostly been unable to place these facts within a new frame or re-
visioning of societies that both builds on universal values and resonates with the 
broader public. The work of re-framing needs to pay attention to the emotional 
power generated by opponents’ frames that stir and explain anxieties. At the same 
time, it must lay the groundwork for a transformative vision of migration, one that is 
ultimately at odds with our nationalist common sense. 
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Notes 
 
1  This is a revised version of a paper originally prepared for the Global Studies Association 
meetings in New York City in June 2008. I thank Tanya Basok, Jane Berger, Marya 
Besharov, Ileen DeVault, Gallya Lahav, Risa Lieberwitz, Verónica Martínez-Matsuda, 
Michele Williams, and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments. 
Raymond Hedaya provided research assistance.  
2   A notable exception is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. This convention has not been ratified by 
any of the migrant-receiving states in the Global North, yet all major migrant-producing 
states have ratified it. 
3   For instance, in recent years the number of worksite raids has increased in the US, including 
those taking place in agriculture at harvest time, and most employers’ organizations have 
supported the passage of comprehensive immigration reform that would legalize 
undocumented immigrant populations in the US and facilitate legal hiring of foreign 
workers. The U.S. Department of Justice also recently cited foreign policy concerns in its 
challenge of the Arizona law, SB 1070, which has generated diplomatic tensions with 
Mexico and other Latin American countries (McKinley, 2010). 
4 These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights; the 1951 Refugee Convention; the United Nations International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families; and the International Labour Organization’s Convention Concerning Migrations 
in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of 
Migrant Workers (ILO No. 143). 
5   This constraint is posed by the plenary power doctrine in the United States, which holds that 
the executive and legislative branches of government have broad powers to regulate 
immigration and make policy free from judicial review. 
6   The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. 
7 The organizations are the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC), National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR), 
National Immigration Law Center (NILC), Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los 
Angeles (CHIRLA), Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), 
National Council of La Raza, and Detention Watch Network. 
8  One case, the Detention Watch Network, makes explicit mention of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
9  In contrast, the two major immigration-restrictionist organizations, the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), make 
no mention of rights but do stress that immigration policies should serve the “national 
interest.” 
10 The National Fugitive Operations Budget increased 23-fold between FY 2003 and FY 2008, 
from $9 million to $218 million (Mendelson, Strom, & Wishnie, 2009, p. 1). 
11 The U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit asking for an injunction against these laws on 
the grounds that they were unconstitutional. In July, 2010, a judge granted a partial 
injunction; the Arizona Governor appealed and at this writing the case awaits a decision 
from the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. 
12 Numbers USA was founded in 1997 and boasts a membership of 450,000. It led an effective 
grassroots opposition to a proposed bill for comprehensive immigration reform in mid-2007 
(Barry, 2008b). 
13 See http://maldef.org/truthinimmigration/. 
14 The H-2A program permits U.S. employers to bring temporary foreign workers into the 
United States for seasonal agricultural work. Employers must certify that U.S. workers are 
not available to perform the work before they may hire a temporary foreign worker under 
this program. See http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1202308216365.shtm. 
15 The New Sanctuary Movement is a network of faith communities around the United States 
that emerged in 2007 to protect immigrants and their families from unjust deportations and 
to change the public debate around immigration. See http://www.newsanctuary-
movement.org/index.html. 
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